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Texas and Columbia, MDA physician is obligated to consider more than a diseased
organ, more even than the whole man—he must view the
man in his world. Harvey Cushing
Although you are not often asked to treat members of
the Jehovah’s Witness denomination, you just accepted
such a patient who is now in the operating suite. He is
among the most suitable candidates you’ve ever evaluated
for endovascular repair of an infrarenal abdominal aneu-
rysm. The patient was directed to you in particular by a
strongly supportive referring physician. During the in-
formed consent process, the patient tells you that he will
not accept a blood transfusion under any circumstances.
You clear your throat and ease past the possibility that
conversion to an open procedure, and the associated in-
creased need for transfusion, could become necessary intra-
operatively. It has been quite a while since you’ve seen a
patient with such straightforward anatomy have problems
requiring conversion, and this patient has a cushiony he-
moglobin of 16 gm/dL. Notwithstanding, the patient
suddenly deteriorates during the graft placement, and an
expanding retroperitoneal hematoma forms. His blood
pressure becomes increasingly difficult to maintain as the
operating room is being set up for open surgery. The
patient’s deep sedation makes discussion and amended
informed consent process impossible. You urgently discuss
the situation with the patient’s wife, who is not a Jehovah’s
Witness. She will sign permission for blood-transfusion
therapy and strongly urges you to transfuse if necessary.
What is your most ethical course?
A. Assume that the patient did not fully appreciate that he
could lose his life without a transfusion and proceed to
transfuse as clinically indicated.
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fusion during an emergency open procedure, transfuse.
C. Transfuse on the wife’s authority.
D. Transfuse and do not tell the patient.
E. Do not violate the patient’s autonomy by transfusing,
even if it means the patient may die.
A number of new religious groups emerged in the
United States during the latter half of the 19th and early
20th centuries. Distinguishing themselves from well-
established Christian denominations, they based them-
selves on novel scriptural interpretations and behavioral
rituals as manifestations of what they believed to be
superior righteousness and Biblical fidelity.
The Pentecostal movement was begun by Charles Par-
ham in about 1901. Mary Baker Eddy founded the Church
of Christ, Scientist in 1879. Charles Russell initiated the
Jehovah’s Witness movement in the 1870s. Scientology,
not a Protestant denomination, was founded by L. Ron
Hubbard in 1952, who declared it a religion in 1960. To
one degree or another, each of these new faiths considered
modern medicine a rival contradictory to its principles, and
they eschewed all or some of its practices.
Some of the Pentecostal churches practiced spiritual or
“faith” healing and discouraged adherents from seeking
professional medical care. The most notorious offshoot of
the Pentecostals, the Snake Handlers, rejects medical treat-
ment for the venomous viper bites its adherents sometimes
sustain. The Pentecostal movement has never been unitary
in its teachings, however, and most members fully accept
modern medical treatment. Christian Scientists typically
reject all the ministrations of organized medicine. They
correctly note that medicine began as a pantheistic pagan
priesthood relying upon the graces of Apollo, Asclepius,
Hygieia, Panaceia, and all other gods and goddesses be-
lieved to be sympathetic to healing. The original Hippo-
cratic Oath confirms this contention. Having concluded
that association with these ancient deities makes the medi-
cal profession anathema to Christianity, Christian Scientists
reject medical interventions. They elect to seek health
through prayer and rejection of the disease concept. Except
in pediatric cases, their beliefs and practices are rarely
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there is no physician encounter. One published study
showed that the longevity of Christian Scientists was signif-
icantly lower than the general population’s.1 The Church
of Scientology asserts the ability to prevent and cure disease
with its auditing process, obviating the need for most
medical treatment, and vociferously rejects the modern
practice of psychiatry, in particular, as both ineffective and
harmful.
Charles Taze Russell founded the Jehovah’s Witnesses
by disseminating what was then an unusual interpretation
of Biblical Scripture. His first converts followed publication
of his new magazine, Herald of the Morning, which subse-
quently became Zion’s Watch Tower and Herald of Christ’s
Presence and then The Watchtower.2 First known as “Russ-
ellites,” the group developed a strong foundation of believ-
ers and able leadership by the time of Russell’s death in
1916. Movement membership increased throughout the
world in the 20th century, and it officially named itself the
Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1931. The Jehovah’s Witnesses
consider their practices and beliefs a return to original first
century Christianity.3 Like the earliest Christians whom
they emulate, they take special pride in opposing to the
utmost any form of authority that would separate them by
force or persuasion from their beliefs and their literal inter-
pretation of scripture.
Prohibition of blood transfusions was added to the Jeho-
vah’s Witness dogma by its governing council, the Watch-
tower Society, in 1945. The basis for the doctrine is estab-
lished by reference to three scriptural sources (Gen 9:3, Lev
17:14, and Acts 15:28-9) forbidding the consumption of
sacrificial blood. The Watchtower Society annually issues wal-
let cards, effectively an advance directive, to the faithful ex-
plaining the risks (but not potential benefits) of transfused
blood, require the member’s signature, and admonish treat-
ing physicians against transfusion should the card holder be
brought to care incapacitated and unable to speak for himself.
The Watchtower Society threatens with “disfellowship,” tan-
tamount to excommunication from the faith, any Jehovah’s
Witness who accepts any transfused blood products other
than those permitted by the Society.
Compliance is almost universal among the faithful, who
are steadfast in their refusal to be transfused with erythro-
cytes that have been separated from their bodies. If the
tubing remains connected to them, as in cardiopulmonary
bypass or with use of erythrocyte retrieval and salvaging
devices, they will usually accept reinfusions of the original
autologous contents and postoperative drainage. The
Watchtower Society does not prohibit acceptance of albu-
men, leaving this decision to each individual. Almost all
Jehovah’s Witnesses will accept treatment with erythropoi-
etin, but they should be informed that the biological is
suspended in human albumen.
By refusing to accept transfusion of erythrocytes, one of
the pillars of surgical therapy, Jehovah’s Witnesses impose a
handicap on surgeons who accept them for major proce-
dures.4 These cases thrust physicians into the unusual po-sition of agreeing to the possibility of allowing an otherwise
salvageable, mentally competent adult to die.
Seventy-nine percent and 84% of physicians responding
to a pair of surveys reported that they had encountered at
least one Jehovah’s Witness patient needing urgent inter-
ventions like emergency surgery.5,6 More than half these
physicians reported having transfused the patients when
they believed that blood was needed, whether or not there
was a signed refusal statement. If a Jehovah’s Witness
patient were exsanguinating, more than half the physicians
surveyed said they would transfuse against the patient’s
wishes, and 26% of them would not tell the patient what
had been done.7
The informed consent process with a Jehovah’s Witness
patient may seem at first specific to this group and of little
relevance to the care of the enormous majority of patients
who do not subscribe to extraordinary religious beliefs that
conflict with standard medical practice. On the contrary,
informed consent actually encompasses the patient’s right
to an informed refusal to consent, including a refusal to
accept life-sustaining care, for whatever reasons the patient
finds the conditions of that care unacceptable.
Physicians will easily accept a patient’s refusal of open-
ended life support in a persistent vegetative state without
skeptically weighing the patient’s value system against their
own personally held beliefs. Almost certainly, physicians
find it easier to cooperate with concepts of patient auton-
omy when treatment decisions closely reflect the values that
they hold themselves and can therefore understand more
readily. Seemingly alien value systems, including those
based in extreme religious or supernatural beliefs, are more
likely to be interpreted by physicians as mistaken, coerced,
or suggestive of severe mental illness. As suggested by the
recent surveys, many physicians will attempt to somehow
circumvent the instructions of these patients, particularly
when the patient’s decisions may have irreversible conse-
quences that the physician believes are contrary to the
patient’s best interests.
For the Jehovah’s Witness patient, the prospect of
avoidable death in service to the religion’s precepts, a tragic
catastrophe in the view of most surgeons, would be of little
importance when compared with righteous preparation for
the eternal life to come. The apparently impossible recon-
ciliation of two value systems at utter variance with one
another—one supernatural and religiously based, one sci-
entific and humanistically based—becomes the substance
of the surgeon’s ethical paradox. What is ultimately more
ethically valid, the patient’s autonomy, even unto death, or
the surgeon’s obligation to preserve the patient’s life and
restore him to health?
Option A may in fact be your first instinctive response
as a surgeon. Particularly when you are almost certain that
with a routine procedure you can restore the patient to full
function and a comfortable resumption of his daily life, it is
practically impossible for a surgeon to imagine that a pa-
tient with an adequate understanding of the risks and
benefits would surrender his life for a religious principle. In
this case, it would be you who is laboring under the
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educated about the mortal risk associated with their refusal
of transfusion, and their resistance almost always becomes
more adamant in direct correlation to the immediacy of the
danger and the intensity of arguments urging them to
accept transfused blood. The advance directive they carry is
reissued annually by their leadership, and members renew
their fidelity to it annually with their signatures. You have
no objective evidence for assuming that your patient has
inadequately considered, or poorly understands, the conse-
quences of his decision. You have in fact a great deal of
evidence that his understanding is clear. Option A cannot
be your ethical choice.
The failure to fully discuss the ramifications of converting
to open surgery is an error entirely of your own making, and
you cannot ethically proceed to use the mistake to justify
forcing a sedated or anesthetized patient to undergo a proce-
dure he would normally reject. Despite your abbreviated
version of the informed consent process, the patient sponta-
neously made clear his refusal to accept transfusion. To justify
disregarding his wishes on the basis of a linguistic trick is
clearly unethical, and you cannot properly select option B.
Option C exposes a serious weak point in modern
medicine’s application of the surrogate decision-making
principle. Surrogate decision making fails to reflect the
patient’s wishes accurately in 70% of important treatment
issues.8 Authorized surrogates (usually first degree relatives
like spouses, parents, adult children, or siblings) are ex-
pected to conform to the ethical standard of substituted
judgment: the surrogate should identify the patient’s rele-
vant values and beliefs and make a decision based on them.
To the degree that they are known or can be determined,
the patient’s interests and wishes regarding his care have
precedence over the surrogate’s interests and wishes,
should they diverge. This is also the legal standard of
surrogate decision making in some jurisdictions. When
those values and beliefs cannot be reliably identified, then
the standard measure is the best interest of the patient. The
surrogate is responsible for authorizing clinical manage-
ment that will protect and promote the patient’s health-
related interests.9 When it can be reliably established that
the surrogate is failing to conform to the substituted judg-
ment standard by incorrectly representing the patient’s
wishes, the surrogate’s instructions are not binding.10
When treating Jehovah’s Witness patients, the durabil-
ity of informed consent can be strengthened by completing
the process in the presence of those designated as surrogate
decision makers. All those who will participate in the
decision-making process should be in agreement about
transfusion therapy, or a written and signed statement
should be obtained from the patient about the specific
protocol to be followed should the need for blood products
arise. This protects the patient’s beliefs and protects the
surgeon from any subsequent suggestion of poor practice
should an operation end disastrously because the patient
withheld consent for life-saving transfusion therapy. It is
clear that in this case the wife is advocating her own viewrather than her husband’s. Her authorization for transfu-
sion is therefore not valid, and option C is not available.
Most surgeons understand their primary duty as the pres-
ervation of life, and can hardly imagine complicity in the
willing surrender of life when a routine procedure will enable
the successful completion of an operation and an almost
certain restoration of the patient to full health. Most surgeons
are furthermore intensely aware of working within in a closely
monitored profession, with our complication and death rates
carefully tabulated and our competence judged by them. Few
of us indeed will gladly see these figures inflated by the peculiar
whims of our patients. After years and years of intellectual and
technical training, and years more of experience, it may be
difficult for surgeons to suppress the sense that we know what
is best for our patients. The niceties of informed consent are
fine until a patient codes in our OR, and then we will do things
our way.
These paternalistic instincts are at once both beneficent
and self-serving, and they are not without virtue. They have
nevertheless been trumped in the last century by common
law and ethical theory that recognizes the surgeon as an au-
thority, but places the patient in authority when decisions
are made about his care. The physician is not entitled to
impose care upon an unwilling patient, or an unwanted
procedure upon a patient seeking care. A psychiatrist may
not coerce or force an unwilling depressed patient request-
ing pharmacologic treatment to accept electroconvulsive
therapy, even if the psychiatrist’s long experience assures
him that ECT will resolve the patient’s condition more
quickly and effectively.
Although physicians have a duty to provide optimal, evi-
dence-based care, they must do so while respecting the pa-
tient’s autonomous decision about the care to be given. The
physician is not obligated to provide a requested treatment he
has reason to believe will be harmful, such as complying with
a drug-dependent patient’s request for narcotics, but he can-
not ethically impose a therapy that the patient specifically
refuses, and he cannot deceive the patient into accepting such
treatment under cover of anesthesia or concealment. In a
Jehovah’s Witness’s world-view, the surgeon who proceeds in
this manner could imperil the patient’s immortal soul. Al-
though the preservation of life may be an absolute value to us
as surgeons, life on earth may be a less absolute value to
individuals with a fervent sense of a life hereafter, and it is not
for us to insist that they are wrong. We are obligated to serve
our patients, not dominate or determine their values for them.
Option D is ethically inconsistent with the principles of patient
autonomy to which our profession claims fidelity.
Although it may seem a bitter pill, option E is the
surgeon’s correct ethical choice. The surgeon should con-
tinue surgical management of this patient without transfus-
ing him. Although a lower percentage of seriously ill pa-
tients may survive surgery under the conditions imposed by
the Jehovah’s Witness faith, competent surgeons usually
bring them through their operations satisfactorily, and even
major surgical care should not be considered futile.
Some surgeons decline to treat Jehovah’s Witnesses be-
cause they find the constraints too confining and the risks too
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prerogatives, don’t want to see their morbidity and mortality
figures rise, and are unwilling to put themselves through the
personal heartache of losing patients. Some others make a tiny
subspecialty of treating Jehovah’s Witnesses within their prac-
tices. Although they do not necessarily subscribe to the Jeho-
vah’s Witness faith, they make themselves fully conversant
with its surgical prohibitions and allowances, study the special
blood conservation and recycling techniques that can some-
times compensate for transfusion requirements, and readily
agree to the faith’s prescribed conditions for surgery. The
Watchtower Society maintains an index of these surgeons and
regularly refers members to them for care.
Although there are only 6.6 million members world-
wide and about 1.5 million in the United States, Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ have precipitated one of the most vexing ethical
conflicts in modern medicine. The dilemma posed by the
Jehovah’s Witnesses becomes fascinating not only because
it impinges upon the critical care of these patients in and of
themselves but also because the ethical problem they
present is emblematic of the extreme assertion of patient
autonomy against the medical profession’s instinct for pro-
tective paternalism and dedication to preserving life to the
extent of its scientific capacities. Patients come to physi-
cians—to surgeons—because they need the knowledge and
service that we can provide and cannot do for themselves
what we can do for them. Though it may sometimes seem
that this dependence confers upon us broader entitlements,it does not. If we are fortunate enough to be able to extend
or improve a life, the life nevertheless remains the patient’s,
to conduct according to his own lights.
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